The implicit power of positive thinking: The effect of positive episodic simulation on implicit future expectancies.

Previous research demonstrating that positive episodic simulation enhances future expectancies has relied on explicit expectancy measures. The current study investigated the effects of episodic simulation on implicit expectancies. Using the Future Thinking Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (FT-IRAP), participants made true/false decisions to indicate whether or not they expected positive/negative outcomes after adopting orientations consistent or inconsistent with an optimistic disposition. The outcome measure, DIRAP, was based on response time differences between consistent and inconsistent blocks. Participants then engaged in either positive simulation training, in which they imagined positive future events, or a neutral visualisation task before repeating the FT-IRAP twice following 10-minute intervals. Positive simulation training increased DIRAP scores for don't-expect-negative trials-boosting participants' readiness to affirm that negative events were unlikely to happen to them. Although findings did not generalise across all trial types, they show potential for positive simulation training to enhance implicit future expectancies.

Rethinking egocentric bias: A computer mouse-tracking study of adult belief processing.

Several theories of belief processing assume that processing another's false belief requires overcoming an egocentric bias toward one's current knowledge. The current evidence in support of this claim, however, is limited. In order to investigate the presence of egocentric bias in adult belief processing, computer mouse tracking was used across three experiments to measure attraction toward response options reflecting one's current knowledge while reporting a false belief. Participants viewed scenarios in which an agent either had a true belief or a false belief about the location of a set of keys. Participants used a mouse to answer reality questions "where are the keys currently hidden?" and belief questions "where does she think the keys are?" Mouse-tracking measures indexing attraction toward response options during decision making were measured, along with time taken to make a response and accuracy. Experiment 1 found no evidence, in any measures, that participants showed a bias toward their own knowledge when reporting another's false belief. Experiment 2 investigated whether differences in event timings between true belief and false belief scenarios in Experiment 1 masked an egocentric bias. Experiment 3 investigated whether the lack of egocentric bias could be explained by participants prioritizing encoding the other's beliefs. Neither follow-up experiment found evidence supporting the presence of an egocentric bias. Overall, contrary to many theories of belief processing, our results suggest that adults are readily able to process other people's beliefs without having to overcome a default bias toward their own knowledge. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Autistic Adults Show Similar Performance and Sensitivity to Social Cues on a Visual Perspective Taking Task as Non-autistic Adults.

Autistic and non-autistic adults completed a visual perspective taking (VPT) task, reporting an object's location from an actor's perspective, or their own. On half the trials the actor looked at and reached for the object, and on half did not. Accuracy and reaction time were measured. In Experiment 1, both groups (N = 34, mean age = 24 years) responded slower when reporting the actor's perspective, with no group differences in this effect. Experiment 2 included "other" VPT trials only. Both groups (N = 30, mean age = 25 years) showed sensitivity to the actor's behaviour, more accurately reporting his perspective when he acted upon the object. No group differences were observed. In contrast to developmental studies, these experiments suggest similar VPT abilities in autistic and non-autistic adults.

Stroop interference is a composite phenomenon: Evidence from distinct developmental trajectories of its components.

Only one previous developmental study of Stroop task performance (Schiller, 1966) has controlled for differences in processing speed that exist both within and between age groups. Therefore, the question of whether the early developmental change in the magnitude of Stroop interference actually persists after controlling for processing speed needs further investigation; work that is further motivated by the possibility that any remaining differences would be caused by process(es) other than processing speed. Analysis of data from two experiments revealed that, even after controlling for processing speed using z-transformed reaction times, early developmental change persists such that the magnitude of overall Stroop interference is larger in 3rd- and 5th graders as compared to 1st graders. This pattern indicates that the magnitude of overall Stroop interference peaks after 2 or 3 years of reading practice (Schadler & Thissen, 1981). Furthermore, this peak is shown to be due to distinct components of Stroop interference (resulting from specific conflicts) progressively falling into place. Experiment 2 revealed that the change in the magnitude of Stroop interference specifically results from joint contributions of task, semantic and response conflicts in 3rd- and 5th graders as compared to a sole contribution of task conflict in 1st graders. The specific developmental trajectories of different conflicts presented in the present work provide unique evidence for multiple loci of Stroop interference in the processing stream (respectively task, semantic and response conflict) as opposed to a single (i.e. response) locus predicted by historically - favored response competition accounts.

Why would a special FM process exist in adults, when it does not appear to exist in children?

Cooper Greve, and Henson (this issue)  caution restraint before accepting that a fast mapping (FM) process exists in adults. We welcome this, but would also add that the original rationale for studying FM in adults is not currently supported by developmental research. Despite the claims of several adult FM researchers, there is little evidence from developmental word learning research for a special hippocampus-independent FM process critical for children's word learning.

Fine Motor Control Underlies the Association Between Response Inhibition and Drawing Skill in Early Development.

Previous research shows that the development of response inhibition and drawing skill are linked. The current research investigated whether this association reflects a more fundamental link between response inhibition and motor control. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-olds (n = 100) were tested on measures of inhibition, fine motor control, and drawing skill. Data revealed an association between inhibition and fine motor control, which was responsible for most of the association observed with drawing skill. Experiment 2 (n = 100) provided evidence that, unlike fine motor control, gross motor control and inhibition were not associated (after controlling for IQ). Alternative explanations for the link between inhibition and fine motor control are outlined, including a consideration of how these cognitive processes may interact during development.

Preschoolers fast map and retain artifact functions as efficiently as artifact names, but artifact actions are the most easily learned.

To become skilled artifact users, children must learn the actions and functions associated with artifacts. We investigated preschoolers' ability to fast map an action, function and name associated with a novel artifact, and retain the new mapping long term following brief incidental exposure to the artifact being used. In Experiment 1, 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 144) were tested 1 week after two exposures to a novel action, function, and name. Participants performed well on comprehension tests of all three kinds of information. In Experiment 2, 3-year-olds (N = 100) were exposed to these three kinds of information only once. Retention of the action-artifact link was above chance levels, whereas retention of function and the name was not. Finally, in Experiment 3, 4-year-olds (N = 128) performed well on an action production task 1 week after brief exposure. In contrast, their performance on a name production task immediately after exposure was poor. Our data suggest that preschoolers can retain function information about a novel artifact from minimal exposure, similar to their ability to learn an artifact name. Crucially, their ability to remember action-artifact mappings is markedly better than their ability to remember functions and names.

Counter-intuitive moral judgement following traumatic brain injury.

Several neurological patient populations, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), appear to produce an abnormally 'utilitarian' pattern of judgements to moral dilemmas; they tend to make judgements that maximize the welfare of the majority, rather than deontological judgements based on the following of moral rules (e.g., do not harm others). However, this patient research has always used extreme dilemmas with highly valued moral rules (e.g., do not kill). Data from healthy participants, however, suggest that when a wider range of dilemmas are employed, involving less valued moral rules (e.g., do not lie), moral judgements demonstrate sensitivity to the psychological intuitiveness of the judgements, rather than their deontological or utilitarian content (Kahane et al., Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7, 2011, 393). We sought the moral judgements of 30 TBI participants and 30 controls on moral dilemmas where content (utilitarian/deontological) and intuition (intuitive/counter-intuitive) were measured concurrently. Overall TBI participants made utilitarian judgements in equal proportions to controls; disproportionately favouring utilitarian judgements only when they were counter-intuitive, and deontological judgements only when they were counter-intuitive. These results speak against the view that TBI causes a specific utilitarian bias, suggesting instead that moral intuition is broadly disrupted following TBI.

A brighter future: The effect of positive episodic simulation on future predictions in non-depressed, moderately dysphoric & highly dysphoric individuals.

Previous research suggests depressed individuals have difficulties with future directed cognitions. For instance, compared with non-depressed individuals, they predict positive events are less likely to occur. Recent work suggests that episodic simulation of positive futures may represent a useful strategy for improving prospective predictions. The current studies investigated positive future episodic simulation as a method of modifying predictions regarding the likelihood of occurrence, perceived control, and importance of positive and negative future events. Experiment 1 compared positive episodic simulation to a neutral visualization task in a non-clinical sample. Predictions regarding future events were rated more positively after the use of positive episodic simulation but not as a result of neutral visualization. Experiment 2 extended these findings to show that future episodic simulation can be used to modify predictions, for both positive and negative events, in individuals experiencing significant levels of dysphoric mood and depressive symptoms. Taken together, these findings suggest that training in positive episodic future simulation can improve future outlook and may represent a useful tool within cognitive therapeutic techniques.

Cognitive correlates of pragmatic language comprehension in adult traumatic brain injury: A systematic review and meta-analyses.

Effective pragmatic comprehension of language is critical for successful communication and interaction, but this ability is routinely impaired following Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) (1,2). Individual studies have investigated the cognitive domains associated with impaired pragmatic comprehension, but there remains little understanding of the relative importance of these domains in contributing to pragmatic comprehension impairment following TBI. This paper presents a systematic meta-analytic review of the observed correlations between pragmatic comprehension and cognitive processes following TBI. Five meta-analyses were computed, which quantified the relationship between pragmatic comprehension and five key cognitive constructs (declarative memory; working memory; attention; executive functions; social cognition). Significant moderate-to-strong correlations were found between all cognitive measures and pragmatic comprehension, where declarative memory was the strongest correlate. Thus, our findings indicate that pragmatic comprehension in TBI is associated with an array of domain general cognitive processes, and as such deficits in these cognitive domains may underlie pragmatic comprehension difficulties following TBI. The clinical implications of these findings are discussed.

Reprint of "Young children's referent selection is guided by novelty for both words and actions".

Young children are biased to select novel, name-unknown objects as referents of novel labels and to similarly favor novel, action-unknown objects as referents of novel actions. What process underlies these common behaviors? In the case of word learning, children may be driven by a novelty bias favoring novel objects as referents. Our study investigated this bias further by investigating whether novelty also affects children's selection of novel objects when a new action is given. In a pre-exposure session, 40 3- and 4-year-olds were shown eight novel objects for 1min. In subsequent referent selection trials, children were shown two pre-exposed objects and one super-novel object and either heard a novel name or saw a novel action. The super-novel object was selected significantly more than the pre-exposed objects on both word and action trials. Our data add to the growing literature suggesting that an endogenous attentional bias to novelty plays a role in children's referent selection and demonstrates further parallels between word and action learning.

Get Your Facts Right: Preschoolers Systematically Extend Both Object Names and Category-Relevant Facts.

There is an ongoing debate over the extent to which language development shares common processing mechanisms with other domains of learning. It is well-established that toddlers will systematically extend object labels to similarly shaped category exemplars (e.g., Markman and Hutchinson, 1984; Landau et al., 1988). However, previous research is inconclusive as to whether young children will similarly extend factual information about an object to other category members. We explicitly contrast facts varying in category relevance, and test for extension using two different tasks. Three- to four-year-olds (N = 61) were provided with one of three types of information about a single novel object: a category-relevant fact ('it's from a place called Modi'), a category-irrelevant fact ('my uncle gave it to me'), or an object label ('it's called a Modi'). At test, children provided with the object name or category-relevant fact were significantly more likely to display systematic category extension than children who learnt the category-irrelevant fact. Our findings contribute to a growing body of evidence that the mechanisms responsible for word learning may be domain-general in nature.

Young children's referent selection is guided by novelty for both words and actions.

Young children are biased to select novel, name-unknown objects as referents of novel labels and to similarly favor novel, action-unknown objects as referents of novel actions. What process underlies these common behaviors? In the case of word learning, children may be driven by a novelty bias favoring novel objects as referents. Our study investigated this bias further by investigating whether novelty also affects children's selection of novel objects when a new action is given. In a pre-exposure session, 40 3- and 4-year-olds were shown eight novel objects for 1 min. In subsequent referent selection trials, children were shown two pre-exposed objects and one super-novel object and either heard a novel name or saw a novel action. The super-novel object was selected significantly more than the pre-exposed objects on both word and action trials. Our data add to the growing literature suggesting that an endogenous attentional bias to novelty plays a role in children's referent selection and demonstrates further parallels between word and action learning.

Parallels Between Action-Object Mapping and Word-Object Mapping in Young Children.

Across a series of four experiments with 3- to 4-year-olds we demonstrate how cognitive mechanisms supporting noun learning extend to the mapping of actions to objects. In Experiment 1 (n = 61) the demonstration of a novel action led children to select a novel, rather than a familiar object. In Experiment 2 (n = 78) children exhibited long-term retention of novel action-object mappings and extended these actions to other category members. In Experiment 3 (n = 60) we showed that children formed an accurate sensorimotor record of the novel action. In Experiment 4 (n = 54) we demonstrate limits on the types of actions mapped to novel objects. Overall these data suggest that certain aspects of noun mapping share common processing with action mapping and support a domain-general account of word learning.

Young children retain fast mapped object labels better than shape, color, and texture words.

We compared short- and long-term retention of fast mapped color, shape, and texture words as well as object labels. In an exposure session, 354 3- and 4-year-old children were shown a set of two familiar and three novel stimuli. One of the novel stimuli was labeled with a new object label, color, shape, or texture word. Retention of the mapping between the new word and the novel object or property was measured either 5 min or 1 week later. After 5 min, retention was significantly above chance in all conditions. However, after 1 week, only the mappings for object labels were retained above chance levels. Our findings suggest that fast mapped object labels are retained long term better than color, shape, and texture words. The results also highlight the importance of comparing short- and long-term retention when studying children's word learning.

Prepotency in action: does children's knowledge of an artifact affect their ability to inhibit acting on it?

Prepotent actions are actions that are strongly triggered by the environment and so tend to be carried out unless intentionally avoided. Understanding what makes an action prepotent is central to an understanding of inhibitory control. The current study investigated actions made on artifacts because in artifact-dense cultures much everyday behavior is focused on them. A total of 80 3-year-olds were tested on a Go/No-go task that required children to make an action on go trials and to withhold it on no-go trials. These actions were made on artifacts with which the actions were either associated (e.g., drawing with a crayon) or unassociated (e.g., drawing with a hammer). Failure to avoid the go action on no-go trials was taken as evidence that the action was prepotent. Results suggested that an action did not need to be associated with an artifact in order for it to be prepotent (so drawing with a hammer could be prepotent). However, associated actions were sometimes produced even when children had been instructed to make an unassociated action. Children sometimes drew with a crayon when told to hammer with it, but they never hammered when told to draw.

Seeing triggers acting, hearing does not trigger saying: evidence from children's weak inhibition.

There is evidence to suggest action imitation is automatic in adults and children. Children's weak inhibitory control means that automatic activation can have dramatic effects on behaviour. In three developmental studies, we investigated whether verbal imitation, like action imitation, is automatic. In Experiment 1 (n=96), 3-year-olds' accuracy was investigated on three well-established inhibitory tasks, and on a novel task which required the suppression of verbal imitation. Experiment 2 (n=48) compared 3-year-olds' accuracy on well-matched action and verbal tasks. In Experiment 3 (n=96), 5-, 7- and 11-year-olds reaction times were compared on verbal and action tasks using conditions that enabled the tasks' inhibitory demands to be assessed. Consistent support was found for verbal imitation being less automatic than action imitation. We suggest that this difference may reflect the greater complexity of speech, and has consequences for children's behaviour and learning.

The role of inhibitory control in the development of human figure drawing in young children.

We investigated the role of inhibitory control in young children's human figure drawing. We used the Bear-Dragon task as a measure of inhibitory control and used the classification system devised by Cox and Parkin to measure the development of human figure drawing. We tested 50 children aged between 40 and 64 months. Regression analysis showed that inhibitory control predicted development in human figure drawing even after the effect of age was excluded. These data suggest that inhibitory control plays a role in the development of children's drawing and imply a relation between the executive functions and representational change.

How do alternative ways of responding influence 3- and 4-year-olds' performance on tests of executive function and theory of mind?

A total of 69 preschool children were tested on measures of false belief understanding (the Unexpected Transfer task), inhibitory control (the Grass/Snow task), and strategic reasoning (the Windows task). For each task, children indicated their response either by pointing with their index finger or by using a nonstandard response mode (pointing with a rotating arrow). The means of responding had no effect on children's performance on the Grass/Snow task or on the Unexpected Transfer task, although children performed better on the Unexpected Transfer task when the key object in the story was removed. In contrast, performance on the Windows task was significantly better when children pointed with the rotating arrow. A follow-up experiment with 79 preschoolers found that this improved performance on the Windows task was sustained even after the nonstandard response mode was removed and children again pointed with their finger. These findings together suggest that nonstandard response modes do not help children to inhibit prepotent pointing responses but may help them to formulate response strategies on reasoning tasks by discouraging unreflective impulsive responding.

Refining the understanding of inhibitory processes: how response prepotency is created and overcome.

Understanding (a) how responses become prepotent provides insights into when inhibition is needed in everyday life. Understanding (b) how response prepotency is overcome provides insights for helping children develop strategies for overcoming such tendencies. Concerning (a), on tasks such as the day-night Stroop-like task, is the difficulty with inhibiting saying the name of the stimulus due to the name being semantically related to the correct response or to its being a valid response on the task (i.e. a member of the response set) though incorrect for this stimulus? Experiment 1 (with 40 4-year-olds) suggests that prepotency is caused by membership in the response set and not semantic relation. Concerning (b), Diamond, Kirkham and Amso (2002) found that 4-year-olds could succeed on the day-night task if the experimenter sang a ditty after showing the stimulus card, before the child was to respond. They concluded that it was because delaying children's responses gave them time to compute the correct answer. However, Experiment 2 (with 90 3-year-olds) suggests that such a delay helps because it gives the incorrect, prepotent response time to passively dissipate, not because of active computation during the delay.